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Abstract
There is scarce research evidence of restorative justice being used in the context of serious 
and organised crime offending. This study sought to explore the feasibility of using restorative 
justice by canvassing the views of experts, serious and organised crime offenders and serious 
and organised crime victims in England. Offenders and victims were given the opportunity to 
engage in a restorative justice initiative and individual cases were pursued accordingly as a series 
of case studies. Case studies were limited to large-scale serious and organised fraud. Stark 
differences in views were apparent between serious and organised crime experts and restorative 
justice experts, the former doubting offenders’ motivations and pointing to their dangerousness 
without fully considering victim perspectives. Despite high attrition rates among some offenders 
expressing an initial willingness to pursue restorative justice, where both parties wished to 
participate, sustained motivation was observed. This study highlights inequities in the way that 
police forces have implemented the 2015 Victims Code requirements for restorative justice in 
England and Wales, potentially blocking opportunities for closure, social integration and reduced 
reoffending.
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Introduction
Restorative justice (RJ) interventions have grown in popularity globally, playing an 
increasingly larger role in resolving conflict in numerous sectors. Within the criminal 
justice sector, RJ has received much attention for low-level offending and its use has 
been extended to some serious and complex cases. Yet, there is one area it seems where 
RJ has not penetrated – the area of serious and organised crime (SOC). Many SOC 
offences do not have identifiable individual victims (such as drug trafficking) but others 
do, such as human trafficking with considerable harm suffered by victims. This raises the 
question of how the police make assessments about eligibility and suitability for RJ.
This study builds on previous research by D’Souza and L’Hoiry (2019) by undertak-
ing attitudinal surveys with RJ and police SOC experts, SOC offenders and SOC victims. 
Offenders and victims were offered the opportunity to pursue RJ if they so wished. As 
SOC is a hotly contested term, this will be explored before considering the use of RJ in 
various serious and complex contexts to explore the relative successes and the specific 
aspects which trouble critics. The methodology will be outlined before presenting the 
findings and discussing the implications for local policing, offenders and victims.
Framed as an ‘alternative paradigm of justice’ (O’Mahony and Doak, 2017: 1), a 
globally recognised definition for RJ provided by Marshall (1999: 5) was adopted:
Restorative justice is a process whereby parties with a stake in a specific offence collectively 
resolve how to deal with the aftermath of the offence and its implications for the future.
RJ is more often used for more minor crime than serious crime. Shewan (2010) found 
that over 77% of police forces used RJ across England and Wales, mostly for low-level 
crime. Acton (2015) refers to a ‘postcode lottery’ in RJ usage, though RJ is increasingly 
deployed in some serious and complex contexts such as domestic violence and hate 
crime (Cunneen and Hoyle, 2010), terrorism (Bueno, 2013) and sexual violence 
(McGlynn et al., 2012). Within the context of organised criminality, Mannozzi (2013) 
describes how, in Southern Italy, the presence of mafia subcultures inhibits the use of 
victim offender mediation. Mutual consent to take part is thwarted by the silencing of 
victims fearful of reprisals and intimidation into compliance by mafia leaders committed 
to retaining power but involved in resolving local conflict, often at the request of police. 
In Northern Ireland, Eriksson (2008) found scope for changing deep-seated violent cul-
tures with the catalyst for change being the experience of using RJ values at an individual 
level and influencing conflict resolution practices at an organisational level. The role of 
former combatants at grassroots level promoted ownership of crime management. In 
addition, in post-conflict situations, the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (Jenkins, 2007) and the Gacaca Courts in Rwanda were deemed successful 
though controversial (Brehm et al., 2014). However, in such cases, the debate continues 
to rage, with cautions against its use due to perceived power imbalances between parties 
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(Busch, 2002), and the extremely complex nature of victimhood rendering this interven-
tion more harmful (Stubbs, 2007). Despite this, numerous scholars assert that RJ is a 
feasible option and even desirable (Walters, 2014). However, there are no published 
studies exploring the use of RJ in the SOC context in England and Wales prior to 2015, 
with studies limited to exploratory research by D’Souza and L’Hoiry (2019), and a pilot 
case study (D’Souza, 2019). This is not a matter simply of entitlement to a service, but 
the denial of the opportunity for victims to potentially ‘move on’ from their experiences 
and lead a psychologically healthier life (Angel et al., 2014), as well as potentially 
becoming more satisfied with RJ outcomes than with either reparation or restitution, due 
to their greater involvement in the process (Beven et al., 2005).
The Victims Code 2015 (Ministry of Justice, 2015)1 specifies an onus on police in 
England and Wales to inform victims about how they can participate in RJ where the 
offender is an adult and RJ is locally available. In addition, where victims request partici-
pation in RJ, they should not be precluded based on the crime perpetrated against them. 
It remains to be seen whether the difficulties in offering RJ within the SOC context are 
due to the conceptualisation of SOC or if there is something qualitatively different about 
SOC that it should not be used for RJ. This exclusion of SOC victims from RJ considera-
tions may show a disparity with the stated values of fairness, impartiality and non-dis-
criminatory services (College of Policing, Code of Ethics, 2014) in relation to 
marginalised communities with protected characteristics, and could be argued to apply to 
those with enhanced vulnerabilities.
Serious and organised crime – Conceptual and operational 
challenges
An exploration of how SOC has evolved on the international and domestic landscape 
will be followed by an analysis of definitional challenges and how this influences polic-
ing SOC. The nature and impact of SOC in England and Wales will be discussed, with a 
focus on organised fraud, as the research case studies were limited to this context.
The concept of ‘organised crime’ (OC) originated from the United States (Antonopoulos 
and Papanicolaou, 2018) in the 1920s. Italian-American organised crime evolved and 
focused mainly on the mafia as criminality based on familial ties (Wright, 2006), subse-
quently spreading to Europe in the 1960/1970s before its adoption worldwide (Hobbs, 
2013). SOC imagery is often associated with connotations derived from the mafia 
(Antonopoulos and Papanicolaou, 2018), conjuring up a foreboding family akin to the 
brutality in Coppola’s Godfather (Wall and Chistyakova, 2015)
Definitional conundrums have dominated scholarly debate for decades with little aca-
demic consensus about what constitutes SOC. However, the United Nations (UN) (2000) 
definition appears to be globally accepted by governments and police, though not recog-
nising non-material benefits as motivation for committing SOC:
‘organised crime group’ shall mean a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a 
period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or 
offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or 
indirectly, a financial or other material benefit. (p. 60)
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The Serious Crime Act (2015) Section 45(6) for England and Wales defines organised 
crime groups (OCGs) as three or more persons who act or agree to act together to commit 
offences. This underpins the basis on which police forces identify OCGs in order for 
them to be formally categorised as such for criminal justice purposes. The Home Office’s 
SOC Strategy (2013) specifies that organised crime is that which is serious, planned and 
coordinated by offenders collaborating on a continued basis. These definitions are vague 
and over-inclusive (Sergi, 2017).
The definition is important as it underpins the basis on which police identify OCGs. 
This all-encompassing definition gives the police freedom to include/exclude offence 
types, for example, to match other operational priorities. Currently, there is an increasing 
focus on vulnerability, prioritising, for example, modern-day slavery and human traffick-
ing, as well as fraud against the elderly. Previously, the main focus was on the distribu-
tion of illegal drugs, thus minimising the relevance of RJ as such offences do not typically 
have identifiable victims (D’Souza, 2020). Notably, victims and effects on victims are 
omitted from the official definitions (Clark, 2005) accentuating their offender-centered-
ness, marginalising the prospect for having identifiable victims with whom a restorative 
dialogue can take place.
There is a gap between the results of empirical research which focuses on the disor-
ganised nature of organised crime with loose flexible networks committing those offences 
(see Sergi, 2017 for a description of policing organised crime as an activity model based 
on intelligence gathering) and law enforcement definitions which classify such activities 
as an enduring single national threat necessitating the resourcing of significant policing 
apparatus and ever-increasing intrusive investigative measures (Lavorgna and Sergi, 
2016). In their study in Scotland, Fraser et al (2018) detail that the nature of organised 
crime has changed with the impact of dark web technologies, the advent of mobile OCGs 
(e.g. those drug distributors who take over vulnerable residents’ homes to extend their 
reach) and the impact of labour exploitation in human trafficking.
British SOC has never easily fitted mafia-type descriptions. SOC tends to be perpe-
trated by agile groups of resourceful career criminals ready to exploit opportunities 
(Europol, 2015). However, it is worth noting that the illegal governance of communities 
via extortion, bullying, restricting competition, threats of violence and intimidation, par-
ticularly evident in areas with low trust levels in formal authority and characterised by 
mass migration, do have some similarities with mafia organisations in non-UK contexts 
such as the Sicilian Mafia (Campana and Varese, 2018). Here, the impact of SOC is 
deemed pervasive and corrosive (Crocker et al., 2017) with a ‘daily impact on the UK’s 
public services, institutions, national reputation and infrastructure’ (National Crime 
Agency (NCA), 2018: 8). The NCA’s framework for responding to SOC is outlined in 
their National Strategic Assessment of SOC (National Crime Agency (NCA), 2018) as 
the 4Ps strategy: (1) Pursue those that cause the greatest harm through successfully pros-
ecuting and disrupting criminal activities, (2) Prepare for when SOC occurs by mitigat-
ing or reducing the impact to re-build levels of resilience, (3) Protect those who are 
vulnerable in order to build resilience and (4) Prevent individuals from engaging in SOC 
by early identification and support for those vulnerable to recruitment into groups. There 
appears to be no indication of the relative prioritisation of each strand other than in ‘hard 
cash’ terms which, so far, have privileged the Pursue strand (D’Souza, 2020). The House 
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of Commons Public Accounts Committee (2019) were damning of the government’s 
response to SOC, highlighting that Pursue was being resourced at the expense of Prevent 
(79% and 4%, respectively). This diminishes the role that RJ may have in the overall 
fight against SOC by encouraging a focus on visible crime, rather than that which tends 
to be invisible such as SOC threats.
UK police forces use a Home Office tool to map each OCG. Utilising gathered intel-
ligence, each individual who is mapped is attributed a role within the OCG to denote 
their level of involvement. A ‘principal’ is typically the head of the crime ‘family’ orches-
trating criminal activities at a strategic level with ‘significants’ playing key roles within 
the business, typically directing activities, and ‘peripherals’ being transient individuals 
who often work at ‘street level’ and carry out the criminal activities, for example, as run-
ners. As Wall and Chistyakova (2015) note, if OCGs are fluid networks rather than hier-
archical, mafia-type organisations, then the UK policing model adopted is likely to be 
less effective. This mapping process is based on the all-encompassing official definition, 
which fails to account for emerging trends and current knowledge about such groups 
(D’Souza, 2020). The SOC strategy now in fact explicitly acknowledges that hierarchi-
cal models may not be the emerging norm. Large-scale organised fraud crime groups 
were the most referred form of case at the time of the research. May and Bhardwa (2018) 
refer to the unrecognised impact of such offending, given previous research has found 
that many victims do not confide in others about their experiences, due to their enduring 
feelings of being duped and acute embarrassment and shame (Button et al., 2014; Cross, 
2015). Doorstep fraud was considered to have a particularly menacing element, as the 
offenders are physically present in front of victims.
Methods
A qualitative-dominant mixed-methods approach was adopted in order to explore 
whether RJ can be applicable in the SOC context. A perception study was undertaken 
involving RJ practitioners, SOC police experts, imprisoned SOC offenders, SOC (ex-)
offenders living in the community and victims2. Participants were asked about their 
views of the use of RJ in an SOC context, with offenders and victims being offered the 
opportunity to undertake RJ if they so wished. If they did this was pursued with a view 
to ascertaining if it could be done safely and how each party would reflect on their expe-
riences. The research also sought to find out if the use of RJ with SOC offenders and their 
victims would indeed be an innovative prospect and to document any anecdotal exam-
ples of its use recorded by the police forces in England and Wales.
First, through the National Police Chief’s Council (NPCC) intranet, forces were asked 
to provide recorded anecdotal examples of the use of RJ within the SOC context. 
Achieved responses represented a 76% response rate from the 42 police forces (exclud-
ing the first author’s home force).
Using the same portal, SOC experts were asked to participate in a semi-structured 
interview via an e-survey or telephone interview. A 79% response rate (representing 36 
experts comprising 19 middle managers and 17 senior leaders) was achieved. Staff were 
based in their specialist units and departments within their respective police forces or in 
the regional organised crime units taking part.
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With the assistance of the Restorative Justice Council (RJC), a focus group of five RJ 
experts and an additional five members participated in online semi-structured surveys/
telephone interviews. An additional seven responses were received from RJ experts 
based on the respective Office of the Police, Crime and Victims’ Commissioner (OPCVC) 
referred by the police SOC experts.
Adult SOC offenders and victims (not matched) were identified by the police North 
East Specialist Operations Unit (NERSOU) and three police forces in the north-east; all 
offenders had been formally mapped as part of an OCG and had an OCG-related offence 
as their current or recent past offence with identifiable victims (hence, excluding drug 
dealers). In all, 12 prisoners from a total of 41 offenders agreed to take part from 7 dif-
ferent prisons across the north-east and north-west. Of the 12 prisoners who participated 
in this study, 5 prisoners were serving sentences of 1–5 years, 6 were serving sentences 
of 6–10 years and 1 was serving a sentence in excess of 11 years. Six had been convicted 
of mainly acquisitive offences and the remainder of mainly violent offences. Four were 
classed by police forces as principals, one significant, three peripherals and four were 
categorised as ‘Not Known’ in terms of hierarchy.
Five out of 15 community-based offenders participated. Data supplied by NERSOU, 
which detailed demographical information as a snapshot in time (1 March 2019), 
were also interrogated. Six out of 10 victims identified agreed to participate. All those 
interviewed took part in audiotaped semi-structured interviews and were given spe-
cially designed RJ briefing sheets and shown video clips (The Woolf Within for offend-
ers and Repairing the Harm for victims). Thematic analysis was chosen to analyse the 
data. For those expressing a wish to pursue RJ when asked whether they would like 
to, as part of the initial research interview, a case-study approach was adopted, build-
ing on a small former study (D’Souza, 2019,) which used a multi-agency model. For 
offender-initiated requests to participate in RJ, the victims were traced and for victim-
initiated requests, the offenders were traced with the help of professionals involved 
within the respective police forces and, where relevant, NERSOU. Following this 
initial expression of interest for pursuing RJ with their victim(s)/offender(s), a fol-
low-up interview was offered by the researcher, who was accompanied by an accred-
ited RJ facilitator where possible. The case studies involved a multi-agency approach 
to share information held by each agency and gather the views of professionals, com-
bined with specialist RJ assessments being undertaken with both parties to determine 
eligibility and suitability. The RJ specialists then, if appropriate, facilitated the RJ 
intervention between the offender and victim with the researcher present as an 
observer. In all cases, the limits of confidentiality were explained and assurances of 
anonymity given.
Findings
The findings first explore the results from the national survey to ascertain the current 
uses of RJ in SOC contexts before exploring the views of the experts surveyed. The 
views expressed by offenders and victims are then explored, followed by details of the 
case studies which were pursued for those expressing a wish to engage in RJ.
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To what extent do the police use RJ with SOC cases currently?
All participating police forces stated that they did not use and had not used RJ in the SOC 
context and could not cite examples of its use currently or historically, confirming that 
the use of RJ in this context was a novel idea. However, examples were given of referrals 
made to specialist RJ units by the police where the offender’s membership of an OCG 
was suspected but unconfirmed, suggesting that some RJ practitioners may have been 
‘working in the dark’ in terms of their knowledge of possible OCG involvement, bring-
ing to the fore the issues of robust risk management and the design of bespoke interven-
tions. This would appear to extend to sharing information. The Management of Police 
Information (MoPI), a legislative framework introduced in 2006, is designed to ensure 
that information is treated in accordance with proportionality, necessity and the manage-
ment of risk on a consistent basis across all forces. One of the key factors is the prioritisa-
tion of information in accordance with perceived risk factors including access to others. 
As the gatekeepers of the necessary data, it would appear that the police have a tendency 
towards protecting such intelligence from those not perceived as having a ‘need to 
know’. RJ experts who may be working with such cases unaware of the offender’s mem-
bership of an OCG may be unable to accurately assess cases and put in place the neces-
sary risk management plan, as they do with other serious and complex cases.
RJ and police SOC expert views
The research interviews focused on experts’ knowledge of RJ, what prevented the use of 
RJ, which offenders/offences they considered RJ may be suitable for and whether they 
considered RJ was a suitable intervention in this context.
Consistent with D’Souza and L’Hoiry’s (2019) preliminary findings, RJ experts dem-
onstrated a high level of conceptual clarity in respect of RJ with explanations such as RJ 
being ‘a restorative space to be heard’ to ‘help them come to terms with the incident or 
allow them to move on’ (RJ8)3 and emphasising the importance of values such as listen-
ing and fair treatment of all parties. Changes in the use of RJ over time to include more 
serious and complex offences and central directives such as the Victims Code which 
place victims’ voices more centre-stage appear to have shaped modern RJ practices:
Much like practice in relation to the use of Restorative Approaches within the contexts of Hate 
Crime, Domestic Abuse and Sexual Violence, I think professionals [in the past] have shared a 
reluctance to offer RJ and a fear that this is ‘too serious’ or an inappropriate intervention in this 
context. (RJ 11)
In contrast, a third of the police SOC experts (12 experts) reported either lacking knowl-
edge of RJ or very negative experiences of using RJ or being involved in RJ as a police 
officer assaulted on duty and feeling ‘disappointed’ and even ‘undervalued’ as a result. 
These no doubt affected their responses to the question asked. Responses were also 
affected by SOC experts’ view of SOC as largely victimless crimes due to the dominance 
of drug-related offending being mapped by forces. A further third (12 experts) conceptu-
alised RJ as an alternative to the adversarial process and suitable only for diverting young 
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people for low-level crimes to prevent criminalisation. A minority expressed the view 
that assessments should be made on a case-by-case basis and that it may be a more eco-
nomically viable option compared to the court process.
In relation to why RJ may not be used in this context, both sets of experts relayed the 
view that the right model to make referrals and assess cases was not in place and that 
cultural change and leadership were required to facilitate change. Risk was perceived to 
be unmanageable by SOC experts and in the main, consideration was not given to using 
this approach due to the perceived challenges of having multiple offenders, multiple 
victims dispersed widely (including across the globe), the size of OCGs, the lack of clear 
delineation between offenders and victims (e.g. in the context of County Lines drug dis-
tribution where OCGs use young people to transport drugs) and the difficulty of identify-
ing victims due to the nature of mapped offending. The degree to which there was doubt 
among SOC experts about the appropriateness of using RJ in this context is typified by 
comments such as the following:
The orchestrators at the centre of organised crime groups are lifestyle career criminals. I think 
you’d be hard pushed to get them to pursue an RJ. I don’t think it’s likely or realistic to expect 
change. (SOC 25)
You didn’t start out as a principal, but lower down, then you saw the profit, saw how lucrative 
it is. You saw the misery at some point climbing up that criminal career path. So, it’s difficult 
to see the benefit of a direct intervention here. (SOC 36)
The clear focus on the Pursue strand of the 4Ps strategy is captured below, typifying 
numerous similar responses:
SOC ‘jobs’ are jobs which are complex and long-winded; it can go on for ten years. People get 
caught up in the loop of getting the file together in a format that can be understood. We’re 
talking about 180 pages of an MG54 and the complexity of a drug dealing operation. Restorative 
justice is the last thing the investigators are thinking about. (SOC 8)
RJ experts highlighted information-sharing difficulties with the police, their reticence 
with RJ referrals generally due to their lack of belief/faith in the disposal and both sets of 
experts alluded to the lack of knowledge and awareness of RJ that (SOC) police person-
nel have.
When asked about the SOC contexts in which RJ may be suitable, RJ experts were reluc-
tant to specify offence types as being more or less suitable, believing that a case-by-case 
assessment was best, particularly in order to abide by the obligations in the Victims Code 
and give choices to both parties. The view below represented the view of the majority:
I am sure that there are factors that may preclude consideration from a restorative approach, but 
I have no experience of RJ with groups – but I do feel you could use this approach in such 
situations. (RJ 10)
Most police SOC experts thought that perhaps RJ may be suitable for ‘significants’ 
and ‘peripherals’, young offenders at the cusp of their offending careers who had been 
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convicted of low-level offending (particularly acquisitive crimes) and those who were 
vulnerable themselves, having been pressurised into offending by those higher up the 
chain. Views were expressed which suggest either complete reticence or the beginnings 
of a willingness to consider the possibilities in principle:
I cannot think of a scenario in my command where it would be appropriate (SOC 21)
I would find that quite abhorrent – I really would find that abhorrent’ (SOC 27) [Comment 
made when referring to the application of RJ for any SOC offences]
We want to target low hanging fruit and starve those higher up the chain, those principals and 
significants who make significant amounts of money, we need to thwart their business model 
and their businesses by starving them of their peripherals. (SOC 27)
Addressing risk and vulnerability were core concerns expressed by the RJ experts, 
including risk stemming from group members not participating in the RJ, accentuating 
the need to work in partnership and carry out an evaluation of risk versus benefit. This 
would require RJ experts to learn more about SOC offending and the mapping process 
and police SOC experts to learn more about the transformative potential of RJ and the 
process involved in assessing groups and undertaking interventions.
Despite reservations, both sets of experts identified potential benefits to offenders, 
their victims and their respective agencies should RJ be used. This ranged from the 
potential for RJ to reduce SOC offending, to break entrenched cycles of behaviour and 
underlying attitudes while securing victim satisfaction in the form of closure, to paving 
the way for more inclusive services. While a small minority of SOC experts felt RJ did 
not provide any opportunities due to insurmountable challenges, some felt that national 
leverage was required to effect change, combined with marketing campaigns.
Exploring the extent to which experts believed that RJ should be trialled in this new 
context, RJ experts were united in their belief that RJ should be actively considered. 
Police SOC experts’ views were more varied, with most expressing strong reservations, 
often because of a misunderstanding that RJ would be instead of a prison sentence:
It is hard to envisage many scenarios where it would be palatable set against this context and 
the threat, risk and harm posed and caused by these types of individuals and groups. (SOC 7)
I’m not really an advocate of RJ in this context because prison could be more of a deterrent. 
(SOC 17)
However, there were some SOC experts who believed that RJ should not be automati-
cally dismissed, but with some caveats:
The evidence base for RJ is very strong. Theoretically, this should apply to SOC. However, the 
data or resources may not always make it practical to conduct RJ safely due to limitations on 
resources. However, the investment in resources may be justified where SOC offenders’ 
behaviour is changed as a result of RJ. (SOC 9)
Definitely worth a try . . . because it’s got to be the right person under the right circumstances 
that has to be under consideration. (SOC 4)
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Senior leaders within the police were overwhelmingly more supportive of RJ com-
pared to their managerial counterparts, with over a quarter of the middle managers 
expressing the view that RJ should be trialled and nearly 60% of the senior leaders advo-
cating such an experimental approach. This finding corroborates with Stockdale’s (2015) 
study which found similar differences in approach in relation to the implementation of 
RJ in a small force between senior leaders, middle managers and operational staff as well 
as Shapland et al.’s (2017) study which found differences between ranks of staff within 
police forces.
SOC offenders’ and SOC victims’ views
SOC offenders and victims interviewed were first asked what their understanding was of 
RJ. Offenders exhibited an understanding of RJ, which was limited by their experiences 
within prisons, that is, victim awareness work and proxy victims who had come into the 
prison to talk about their experiences of victimisation, but of offences dissimilar to the 
offender’s own offending. The latter caused some confusion with, for example, one 
being perplexed by this: ‘which I find a bit unusual because you’re never gonna be able 
to relate to that are you?’ (P004). Initial knowledge was limited to RJ being an offer 
involving indirect victims, which has implications for the extent to which offenders who 
are imprisoned or subject to community penalties are able to make informed choices 
about what RJ may be able to offer them. Victims interviewed understood the RJ concept 
as a victim-centred option where the primary aim was to induce shame/guilt through 
offenders learning about the impact that their actions had on victims.
In expressing views about the efficacy of RJ, offenders focused on its suitability 
where there were direct identifiable victims (but excluding DV and sexual offenders) 
while victims focused on its appropriateness for young offenders with prospects for reha-
bilitation – mirroring some of the views of SOC experts. Offenders and victims stated 
that they favoured the sequencing of staged RJ interventions commencing with letters of 
explanation and shuttle mediation and advancing to face-to-face interventions if previ-
ous dialogue had progressed well.
It appeared that prison may be a fruitful place to offer RJ interventions as those with 
addictions reported sobriety and being ‘clean’, that is, free from illegal drugs, enabling 
them to be more in touch with feelings:
When I’m like this . . . I do have feelings. I do care, I don’t want people to be hurt . . . I don’t 
want anyone to be worried or scared . . .. but when I’m drunk, I just don’t give a shit about 
anything, that’s the only difference with me, but when I’m normal like this, I don’t . . . I 
wouldn’t hurt a fly, you know what I mean, Nikki? (P005)
Over half of all offenders felt that participating in RJ would result in reducing their 
reoffending, which is lower than in Shapland et al.’s (2011) study where 80% of offend-
ers felt that RJ would have a similar impact when confronted with their victims.
Offenders (who had committed a variety of SOC mapped offences) believed that 
engaging in RJ would enable their victims to see them as they saw themselves – someone 
who had made mistakes, was essentially good and prepared to make amends. Victims (of 
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fraud) felt that engaging in RJ would confirm that they were duped fools and reinforce 
their own views about themselves. However, both parties expressed much empathy with 
each other when exploring what they may stand to lose or gain from engaging with the 
other party.
Case studies
Five prisoners gave an initial indication that that they were ‘very keen to pursue RJ’ (with 
case studies pursued for all five cases), with another five saying they were ‘prepared to 
pursue RJ’ (which resulted in one case study). The remaining two prisoners were not 
very keen/not at all keen to pursue RJ. Using a multi-agency framework previously used 
for a pilot case study (D’Souza, 2019), case studies were taken forward, resulting in one 
letter of explanation followed by shuttle mediation (facilitators mediate between the par-
ties without them needing to meet face to face) as part of a staged approach with a sig-
nificant OCG member, a case of shuttle mediation with one principal, and one face-to-face 
conference which was preceded by a series of shuttle mediations with a principal (this 
was a victim-initiated intervention). While multi-agency forums were convened in all 
cases where the prisoner had initial willingness to pursue RJ, the attrition rate, in part, 
can be explained by an issue of timing – the wrong time to engage with their victims due 
to a myriad of personal problems such as serious mental health, fighting for child access, 
and so on. Timing for offenders is acknowledged as potentially playing a key part in the 
process involved in successful engagement with RJ (Crawford, 2015). Perhaps this is not 
surprising, as offenders too need to come to a point when they are emotionally ready for 
RJ. More research in relation to emotional readiness is required, with much of the exist-
ing literature focusing on victims’ readiness (e.g. Morris et al., 1993).
Of the five community-based offenders (two principals, one significant and two 
peripherals), one case study with a significant resulted in a letter of explanation and a 
shuttle mediation.
Seven fraud victims ranging from their 50s to 80s (four women and three men) par-
ticipated having experienced fraud-related offences, for example, doorstep fraud and 
online banking fraud. While three victims were not keen or did not know if they wished 
to participate, one was very keen (leading to a shuttle mediation with two significants 
from the same OCG) and three were prepared to pursue RJ. This resulted in RJ dialogue 
with the prisoners and community-based offenders described above, with the first author 
utilising NERSOU to assist in identifying the other party. RJ dialogue took place as part 
of a series of staged interventions, typically commencing with letters, progressing to 
shuttle mediation and one culminating in a conference.
Post-RJ, both offenders and victims reported emotional closure, with offenders detail-
ing that their RJ participation acted as a trigger experience to reduce their reoffending 
potential and be part of society and victims specifying feelings of ‘moving on’, with 
increased social capital and mental health benefits. Victims also relayed that having felt 
unable to confide in others about their financial losses and the acute shame and embar-
rassment that they had felt, their emotional wellbeing improved. This may indicate that 
having experienced feelings of isolation due to victimisation, they too felt better inte-
grated back into their local communities. The results are similar to the benefits expressed 
12 Criminology & Criminal Justice 00(0)
by adult offenders and victims of other serious offences, such as robbery, assault and 
burglary (Shapland et al., 2011).
Potential areas of risk were seen as arising from non-participating OCG members 
towards the participating offender, particularly if they are perceived to be ‘assisting the 
police with their enquiries’, as well as participating victims and their sets of supporters. 
Risks included those from participating offenders to their victims (particularly, if the 
victim does not wish to participate in an offender-initiated request) and the community. 
Other considerations included whether participating offenders are motivated to engage in 
order to gather information about policing operations and victims, and also whether 
police use the process to gather intelligence on OCG operations in order to inform dis-
ruption activities (the latter contravening RJ values).
Discussion
Key themes that emerged relate to the differences in knowledge about RJ between the 
two sets of experts and SOC experts’ focus on operationalising the ‘Pursue’ strand of the 
national strategy, while denying victims’ agency, some of which points to the difficulties 
for reform within this area of policing. The concepts of closure, reintegration and timing 
were evidently relevant for both offenders and victims. Logistical challenges in using RJ 
in SOC cases are clearly significant.
While RJ experts self-confessed to a lack of knowledge about SOC and asked for 
more training, police SOC experts appeared to lack basic information about RJ as a dis-
posal, for example, what the purpose of RJ is, at what points in the adversarial process it 
can be used and that it can be used in parallel with criminal justice.5 This has inevitably 
led to a lack of consideration of this option with SOC cases. Differences in views seemed 
to divide senior police leaders and their operational middle managers in relation to 
whether RJ should be trialled, signalling the pressures on frontline staff to deliver a high-
level vision, which may not translate into how they work routinely. A dominant Pursue-
driven, offender-orientated focus was evident at the expense of Prevent-focused 
victim-oriented6 consideration (D’Souza, 2020), though some believed that an experi-
mental approach could be taken with low-level SOC offenders as new recruits to an 
OCG, were victims themselves and not heavily convicted (as part of a diversionary 
scheme).
The police focus on RJ for SOC has paternalistic undercurrents of denying victims’ 
agency, leading to neglected aspects such as measures to ensure that victims can derive 
satisfaction from involvement with criminal justice, find closure from being victimised 
(repeatedly), and secure their emotional/mental wellbeing with its attendant health-
related benefits. It is only relatively recently that policing in England and Wales has 
developed priorities in relation to vulnerability (e.g. child abuse, mental health and vic-
tims), as opposed to focusing primarily on investigation and prosecution of offences and 
emergency responses. It is possible that this change in values had not yet impinged on 
senior SOC detectives. However, this investigation/Pursue offender–oriented mindset, 
combined with officers’ lack of knowledge about RJ and the obligations which form the 
backbone of the Victims Code (designed as an empowerment and entitlement frame-
work), was ensuring that the status quo was retained.
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A host of commonly held assumptions about RJ were evident which inhibited its use, 
ranging from a view that RJ is only available in lieu of prosecution and court processes 
(i.e. as diversion); SOC offenders and victims would be unwilling to engage with one 
another; to a perception of RJ as a ‘soft option’ with little public support for use with this 
type of offending and so should not be offered to principals and significants. There was 
a general view that preventive work was the job of other agencies while the police 
experts’ role was mainly reactive. Of note was that RJ experts based in police-commis-
sioned services and SOC professionals held different views and this has implications for 
how the overall vision of the police force was communicated and indeed, realised and 
mirrored by the differences described in the level of support for RJ between police senior 
leaders and middle managers. Set against this context, it is little wonder that Acton 
(2015) observed a ‘post code lottery’ in terms of RJ implementation across the UK. 
However, it would appear from the current research that there is some potential for 
change – that RJ and SOC experts believed that they have much that they can learn from 
one another with a view to resolving information-sharing difficulties and 
knowledge-exchange.
Many offenders, while communicating high levels of initial willingness to pursue RJ, 
withdrew at the point at which the follow-up interview took place. A host of explanations 
were offered, ranging from a lack of emotional readiness to have a dialogue with their 
victims to expending energies on being drug or alcohol-free. However, where motivation 
was evident, it was sustained over lengthy periods – the researcher engaged for nearly 
2 years with one offender and some of his victims. Both offenders and victims reported 
benefiting from having communications with their harmer/harmed, comparable to that 
reported with non-SOC crime types. It would appear that offenders and victims have 
some aspects in common when RJ is used in the fraud context: the concepts of closure 
are relevant for both (not only victims), reintegration is relevant for both (not only 
offenders) and timing is of significance to both (with a need for ‘emotional readiness’ 
assessments).
This study has shown that there is potential for the use of RJ in SOC cases, even with 
some principals, at least for fraud cases. There is nothing qualitatively different about 
SOC cases in relation to the possible use of RJ, though it remains to be evidenced whether 
RJ has wider applicability in non-fraud cases. Its lack of use stems from preconceptions 
by criminal justice personnel as to how offenders and victims will feel and be affected, 
combined with mapping processes based on the vague official/police definitions of what 
constitutes SOC (D’Souza, 2020). Nonetheless, there is a need for caution and multifac-
eted risk assessment, as with other serious and complex cases.
Challenges of a significant magnitude need to be addressed before more widespread 
use of RJ can occur. The process, with its need for multiple risk assessments, is costly – 
including costs related to complex multi-agency collaboration, lengthy preparation 
phases, detailed intelligence gathering, specialist sources of support for vulnerable vic-
tims, training to ensure specialist knowledge, and the costs of staged interventions as 
favoured by SOC offenders and SOC victims, all exacerbated by the size of OCGs. 
However, the biggest challenge yet may be to shift the attitudes of police personnel in 
relation to their conceptualisation of SOC, due to a lack of consideration of the wide pos-
sible spectrum of SOC offences in their ‘official’ definition. Experts only thought of the 
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‘high end’ of criminality when discussing SOC in the main and this, no doubt, had an 
impact on RJ considerations.
This exploratory study is limited. However, despite small sample numbers and with 
case studies limited to fraud, the study attracted significant professional engagement. 
Offender and victim samples were not representative groups, nor were the SOC offences 
representative due to purposive sampling7. However, research with exceptionally hard-
to-reach offender and victim groups may have smaller numbers and still be useful (Hobbs 
and Antonopoulos, 2014). The results may only hold for fraud, though this in itself has 
revealed the UK police biases in defining and operationalising the concept of SOC. In 
addition, the long-term impacts in terms of recidivism, reintegration and satisfaction for 
offenders and victims who pursued RJ could not to be measured, as this was a time-
limited research project.
While the findings suggest possibilities, there are clearly challenges in translating the 
theory into practice. Perhaps the most important issue raised is a values-driven one: one 
of fairness, transparency, respect and equity to ensure that SOC offenders and victims are 
not discriminated against on the basis of the nature of the offence(s) committed, and 
victims by the age of their offender(s). This is part of the commitment by police forces to 
deliver inclusive services. Victims and offenders should not be denied agency to make 
informed decisions and exercise choices. Furthermore, it is likely that without a signifi-
cant change in the funding formula for how the 4Ps are resourced (House of Commons 
Public Accounts Committee, 2019), individual police forces will not be enabled to redi-
rect some of their focus towards preventive and early intervention work. The situation is 
also unlikely to change if SOC imagery (Antonopoulos and Papanicolaou, 2018) contin-
ues to be associated with untold threats masking unimaginable horrors, thus reducing the 
possibilities of using innovative preventive resolutions and reaffirming Pursue offender–
oriented policies.
All of the above signal the challenges of translating the realities of how SOC is com-
mitted into a single legislative definition, which can assist the police in targeting offend-
ing and responding to it, from a law enforcement perspective. The vagueness of the UK 
police definition of SOC may give some clues about why SOC may be deemed inappro-
priate in relation to RJ. Police SOC definitions fail to capture the complexity and shape-
shifting nature of organised crime and do not reflect the picture that emerges from 
research. The findings highlight the need to redefine/reform ‘official’ UK and English 
conceptualisations of organised crime and SOC, and hence how it is perceived it should 
be policed, allowing appreciation of victim needs. This then, may have implications for 
widening the net to consider those offenders/offences for RJ which are currently dis-
missed as inappropriate, so also enabling non-fraud cases which have had major effects 
in the community to be considered.
Currently, it would appear that victims become a victim of process in relation to agen-
cies’ failure to provide timely and accurate RJ information (with its attendant relation-
ship with dissatisfaction, disengagement and inequity of service provision), in addition 
to being victims of SOC. This is compounded by a police definition of SOC, which 
overlooks the victim perspective (Clark, 2005) and compels police officers to follow an 
exclusively prosecutorial route to conclude the case.
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Notes
1. In force at the time of the research.
2. One victim was living in Scotland at the time of the interview and one restorative justice (RJ) 
practitioner was from Scotland.
3. All respondents have been given a code, hence ‘RJ’ as RJ expert, ‘SOC’ (serious and organ-
ised crime) as police SOC expert and so on.
4. The MG5 (Manual of Guidance 5) is a police report which can be disclosed to the defence 
and the court and is a case summary. Further information and a blank copy of the MG5 can be 
found at: https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/bcm-mg5-how-to-complete.
pdf
5. See similar findings among frontline and community police officers in Shapland et al (2017).
6. This is not to say that SOC police personnel were not protective of their victims; indeed, they 
were. All expressed deep concern and care in relation to victims and protecting them from 
organised criminals. However, police personnel believed that they should make the decisions 
as to what was best for the victims, hence denying them their own agency (a term used by 
O’Mahony and Doak, 2017) to make informed choices.
7. For more detail on how cases were sought and attained, see D’Souza (2020).
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